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PREFACE
In a previous article dealing with flag, coastal and port state control,1 I
suggested that the shipping industry was closing the net on unseaworthy
ships and their unscrupulous owners. At that time, in early 1994, I shared
the shipping industry's hesitancy to acclaim the success of port. state control
measures which were burgeoning around the maritime states of the world.
There are now positive indications that port state control is proving more
effective than even its most ardent early proponents would have hoped.
"Port State Control," as a concept, involves the powers and concomitant
obligations vested in, exercised by, and imposed upon a national maritime
authority (or its delegee) by international convention or domestic statute or
both. Port state control confers the power to board, inspect and where
appropriate detain a merchant ship flying a flag foreign to that state. The
aim of port state control is to ensure compliance of ships with all applicable
international safety at sea instruments and with any domestic legislative
maritime safety requirements.
This article will seek to explore the legal basis of international port state
control and the manner in which it has matured over the past fifteen years
into what has become the most effective cure of the malaise of the maritime
industry.'
However, in focusing on the legality and operation of port state control,
one should remain conscious of the fact that it is but one of a compendium
of three prime jurisdictions which have a collective responsibility to ensure
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at the University of Cape Town.
'John Hare, Flag, Coastal and Port State Control-Closingthe Net on UnseaworthyShips
and their Unscrupulous Owners, Sea Changes, 1994, at 57,
<http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/portstat.htm> (last modified September, 1997).
2 See generally Grant Clark, The Sub-Standard Ship and Port State Control in South
Africa (1996) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, University of Cape Town Institute of Marine
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the maintenance of standards at sea. The first such jurisdiction isflag state
control which means the international and domestic powers and obligations
of a state which allows vessels to register under its flag. The birth of port
state control may probably be traced to the failure of the majority of flag
states (certainly by volume of tonnage registered) to properly carry out their
responsibilities in administering their ships' registers.'
The second of the control measures is the jurisdiction of a coastal state to
police the use of its waters by foreign tonnage. This jurisdiction, and its
limitations and inadequacies, was also examined in my earlier article.'
Port state control, as the third jurisdictional regime, should not be viewed
in isolation from its two counterparts. But the time has clearly come when
the maritime industry can embrace and applaud port state control as an
instrumental force in bringing the industry back from the brink of disgrace
where it was teetering at the beginning of this decade.
I. THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF PORT STATE CONTROL
The concept of a state exercising its jurisdiction over ships that ply its
waters-particularly those that call at its ports-is well established in both
history and legal practice:
It is universally acknowledged that once a ship voluntarily
enters port it becomes fully subject to the laws and regula-
tions prescribed by the officials of that territory for events
relating to such use and that all types of vessels, military
and other, are in common expectation obliged to comply
with the coastal regulations about proper procedures to be
employed and permissible activities within internal waters.'
But the practice of the majority of ports, at least until the last decade, was
to give scant inspection to calling vessels. A pilot may well have checked
Hare, supra note 1, at 61 (describing the international obligations applicable to flag state
jurisdiction, and the failure of the flag state system generally).
4Id. at 65.
' Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 156
(New Haven Press 1987) (1962), (referring also to the U.S. prohibition laws which were
applied to foreign vessels calling at U.S. ports). See, e.g., Cunard SS Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
119 (1922); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818).
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whether the vessel was loaded below her marks, but even this was circum-
vented by the common and immensely dangerous practice of "hogging" a
ship to bend her load line above the water line. Maritime authorities were
concerned almost exclusively with the affairs of their own ships (and then
too often in a lackadaisical manner). With the growth of flags of conve-
nience (many of whose maritime authorities turned a blind eye to the
condition of the vessels whose fees they so readily received), with the lack
of interest by port authorities, and with the inadequacies of general coastal
state policing of passing ships, the unseaworthy ship (euphemistically
referred to 'sub-standard') abounded. That this slide was hastened by the
general decline in world trade in the late 1970s, particularly for non-
containerized break bulk cargo vessels, bulk carriers and tankers, cannot be
denied. Surplus and superannuated tonnage long overdue for the scrap-yard
can only be used to make meager profits in the hands of marginal and
economically stressed ship-owners.
It was in relation to oil tankers (many of which were knocked together
with undue haste in the oil boom of the early 1970s) that the international
community first sat up and took notice that there was perhaps something
untoward going on in the shipping industry. The sad reality of newsmaking
is that it is often easier to galvanize public opinion with a single photograph
of three forlorn oil-soiled penguins than with a headline recording the
sinking of yet another bulk carrier with all hands lost.
The control and prevention of oil pollution has long occupied the minds
of international maritime legislators.6 The chapter of major oil tanker
casualties, starting with the grounding of the Torrey Canyon in 1967, gave
a very conspicuous public face to the vagaries of shipping and the tragedy
of what can happen when things go wrong. Less conspicuous was the
continuing appalling loss of non-tanker merchant ships, particularly bulk
carriers, which remains one of the prime causes of concern of the shipping
industry to this day.7
6 As early as 1916 South Africa followed the lead of Australia in passing an act which
prohibited the discharge of oil into navigable waters. This lead was followed by the United
Kingdom in its 1922 Oil in Navigable WatersAct. Apart from a draft convention prepared
in 1926 in Washington, there was no international oil pollution control until the 1954
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. This Convention
took up the proposals of the 1952 Faulkner Committee and was in turn used to found the oil
pollution prevention provisions of the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention.
7 A recent illustration of this was the loss of the bulker Leros Strength, which went down
with all hands in February 1997, in circumstances which suggest that the vessel was well past
her safe working life. See also the Institute of London Underwriters' Casualty Returns infra.
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While oil pollution casualties may well have highlighted sub-standard
shipping as a green issue,8 the continuing loss of seamen's lives is the crux
of the issue and the catalyst that has given strength to the arms of the ILO,
the IMO, and the ITF in coordinating international reaction.'
The international maritime community had previously sought to establish
regimes for self regulation; as early as 1876, the agitation of British MP
Samuel Plimsoll led to the U.K.'s Merchant Shipping Act of 1876 which
enshrined the requirement of a load-line for all merchant ships. The
successor to Plimsoll's Act, the present load-line convention, is one of the
package of conventions relied on for port state control.' 0
And the maritime community did not address issues of safety at sea solely
in relation to oil pollution and load-lines. As early as 1914, following a
conference in London," the first SOLAS"2 was concluded. The four
subsequent SOLAS conventions 3 have covered most areas of maritime
safety and are continually updated under the auspices of the IMO.
Disaster begets action and remedy. It took the loss of the Amoco Cadiz
off the coast of Britanny in 1978, with a cargo of 227,000 tons on board, to
focus the world's attention on the sea. The Amoco Cadiz spurred the
IMO 4 into re-examining the laws of salvage-an initiative which was then
taken over by the CMI s in preparation for the draft Montreal Salvage
Convention which in turn led to the London Salvage Convention of 1989
(not yet in force). It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of the
international conventions which impact upon the safety of ships at sea;
suffice it to state that collectively, as will be pointed out below, they provide
the framework for port state control inspections, and without them, and the
considerable labors that preceded their conclusion, port state control would
have as little direction as it would have teeth.
' Clarke, supra note 2, at 209.
9 The International Labour Organisation, the International Maritime Organisation and the
International Transport Workers' Federation respectively.
'0 See infra note 23.
" It is interesting to note that this conference followed the loss of the Titanic on her
maiden voyage across the Atlantic in April 1912-a disaster which prompted the U.K.
government to call a conference to discuss safety issues.
2 See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
T.I.A.S. No. 9700, 14 I.L.M. 963.
"3 Adopted in 1929, 1948, 1960 and 1974.
14 Then known as the International Maritime Consultative Organization.
"S Comite Maritime International, the international association of maritime law
associations.
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II. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As has been alluded to above, the ILO and the ITF have played significant
roles in applying pressure upon maritime states to apply relevant safety
conventions and regimes. The CMI has also played its part in addressing
salvage and safety issues. But it is upon the IMO that responsibility for
drawing up and implementing safety standards became focused. The IMO,
then known as IMCO, was established by United Nations (U.N.) resolution
in 1948. The 1948 SOLAS convention which followed took heart from the
fact that for the first time there was to be a permanent international authority
which could lobby for and enact international conventions to regulate
shipping. The IMO, especially during the 1950s, played a leading role in the
preparation of UNCLOS."6 It has since sponsored and spearheaded the
various subsequent SOLAS conventions establishing and improving load
lines, navigation, watchkeeping, building and registration requirements of all
ships.
In addition to the promotion of international conventions, the IMO passes
its own assembly resolutions which in turn bind the member states of the
IMO. Therefore, it is these resolutions coupled with the international
conventions, which impose obligations on port states to exercise the controls
envisaged by the resolutions.
The IMO has recently consolidated its port state control measures. 7 The
consolidated resolution and its annexures set out the procedures for port state
control in chapter and verse. Inspections are categorized as initial port state
inspections and as more detailed inspections. Guidelines are provided for
detention and reporting procedures.
6 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1958. UNCLOS article 25 may
be seen as the first international legal basis for port state control. The article empowered
states to take necessary steps to prevent any breach of conditions to which the call of any
vessels at its ports may be subject. Articles 216 and 218 enable a port state to enforce
international anti-dumping and anti-pollution measures, with article 219 giving states power
to take administrative measures to prevent errant vessels from leaving port. To the extent that
an unseaworthy ship may, at least through her bunkers, present an oil pollution threat,
authority may be found in these articles for the intervention of a port state authority in most
instances. The only limitation was that steps taken be reasonable, public, and not discrimina-
tory.
17 Resolution A787(19): Procedures for Port State Control. The full text of this important
document is reproduced with the permission of the IMO on the UCT Marine & Shipping Law
website, <http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/portstat.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
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Not only do the IMO provisions require surveys and inspections to ensure
that vessels comply with the appropriate international conventions, they now
make it possible for port state control officers inspecting foreign ships to
check operational requirements "when there are clear grounds for believing
that the master or crew are not familiar with essential ship board procedures
relating to the safety of ships."' 8 The Resolution makes particular reference
to passenger ships and ships which may present a special hazard. 'Clear
grounds' are defined in the Annex to the Resolution and include operational
shortcomings, cargo operations not being conducted properly, the involve-
ment of the ship in incidents caused by operational mistakes, absence of an
up-to-date muster list, and indications that crew members may not be able
to communicate with each other in a common language. This is a departure
from the previous constraints of port state control inspection. Port state
control officers were previously limited to checking certificates and
documents. The Resolution confirms that if conditions are not valid, or if
there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the ship or of its
equipment or its crew are not up to scratch, a more detailed inspection may
be carried out. Moreover, there is considerable focus on the crew's ability
to carry out safety functions on board ship.
It should also be noted that the IMO plays an active role as observer in
the activities of the regional port state control co-operation groupings
referred to below.
The IMO recognizes that it is not the deliberate intent of states to allow
substandard ships to operate under their flags. Some states, particularly
developing nations with new registers, lack adequate resources for policing
their own fleet, let alone the fleets of other vessels calling at their ports. The
IMO has assisted greatly in training governments to improve their own
maritime inspectorates, and plays a leading role in maritime education
generally through the World Maritime University. Of the IMO's role in
relation to port state control, its current Director, Mr. William O'Neil, had
the following to say on World Maritime Day in 1996:
Shipping is an international industry which is proud of its
tradition of freedom of the seas, but that does not mean that
ships can sail wherever they like regardless of their condi-
tion. The maritime world has the right to expect that ships
of all nations meet the levels of safety and environmental
" Id., adopted Nov. 23, 1995.
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protection which have been internationally agreed upon. It
is up to shipowners to make sure that their ships are safe,
properly manned and do not pollute the seas and it is the
duty of governments to make sure that ships which fly their
flag comply with the standards laid down in the IMO
treaties which they have ratified. If they fail to do so, then
IMO-which has the stewardship of these standards-has
not only the right but the obligation to take further ac-
tion. 9
It is thus the IMO which is prescribing the medicine. The IMO's
medicine chest will be much strengthened by the advent of the SOLAS
requirement for ISM certification. This certification, coupled with a Safety
Management System (SMS), is due to take effect on July 1, 1998, and will
impose upon ship-owners definitive standards of operation and management.
These standards will become the benchmarks against which port state control
inspectors may in the future assess compliance.
III. REGIONAL INITIATIVES-THE MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING
Crucial to the success of port state control operations is the sharing of
information gained about particular ships or their owners and operators,
between jurisdictions in and out of which those ships trade. The reason for
this is twofold. First, ships are unduly inconvenienced if they are inspected
at every port. Second, sharing information forewarns maritime states of the
delinquents in their midst. The establishment of regional initiatives in which
states are tied together in their port state control activities by memoranda of
understanding ("MOU's"), are becoming increasingly significant and will one
day encompass most of the world's oceans and ports. With the ease of
dissemination of information through the internet, the various regional
initiatives, set up for geographic convenience, will increasingly share each
other's databases, thereby closing the net even more effectively on the
unseaworthy ship and its unscrupulous owner seeking to ply a trade into
unsuspecting ports.
,' The text of O'Niell's address is at the IMO's website,
<http://www.imo.org/imo/wmd/96messag.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
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The first and perhaps most prominent of the regional groupings is the
Paris Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed in 1982.2o
The Paris MOU was born of the December 1980 Regional European
Conference on Maritime Safety. This Conference focused upon the need to
increase maritime safety, the protection of the marine environment, and the
importance of improving living and working conditions aboard ships. The
green issues and the human rights issues, at that stage still appallingly
neglected, were the impetus for the Conference. It is thus interesting to
examine the preamble paragraphs of the MOU:
Mindful that the principal responsibility for the effective
application of standards laid down in international instru-
ments rests upon the authorities of the state whose flag a
ship is entitled to fly;
Recognizing nevertheless that effective action by port states
is required to prevent the operation of sub-standard ships;
Recognizing also the need to avoid distorting competition
between ports;
Convinced of the necessity for these purposes of an im-
proved and harmonized system of port state control and of
strengthening co-operation and the exchange of informa-
tion.2'
The groundwork was laid for effective international co-operation in this
MOU.22 The key to the Paris MOU (and indeed to others and to port state
control itself) is a requirement that each contracting state will ensure,
through an effective system of port state control, that foreign merchant ships
20 Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on
Maritime Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, Jan. 26, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1
[hereinafter Paris MOU]. The Paris MOU binds the maritime authorities of Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, U.K. and Northern Ireland. The Russian Federation became a member on
January 1, 1996. The MOU also admits "co-operating authorities" (e.g., U.S. Coast Guard,
Croatia and Japan). See IMO News 2/96 available at
<http://www.imo.org/imo/news/296/summary.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
21 Paris MOU, supra note 20.
22 The effectiveness of the Paris MOU resulted in the IMO passing Resolution A.682(17)
on "Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships and Discharges," and inviting governments
to form regional initiatives for port state control in co-operation with IMO.
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calling in its ports comply with the international instruments listed in the
MOU.
23
The MOU has required each contracting authority to inspect an annual
total of 25 percent of foreign merchant ships calling at its ports since 1985.
Each authority should "consult, co-operate and exchange information" with
other authorities. Moreover, authorities should "seek to avoid inspecting
ships which have been inspected by any of the other authorities within the
previous six months unless they have clear grounds for inspection., 24
The 1982 Paris MOU required that port state control be conducted
"without discrimination as to flag." It also required each state to insure that
no more favorable treatment be given to ships flying the flag of a state not
party to the memorandum. As will be seen below, however, port state
control has matured to the stage where it now recognizes the need to accept
the stark reality that some ships pose more of a problem than others. Most
MOUs now allow (indeed require) discrimination upon the basis of flag, age,
type of vessel, loan owner, operator, or even known classification society."
The Paris memorandum sets out detailed guidelines as to inspection
procedures and detention. The prime purpose of detention is to insure
rectification of defects in the vessel. Thus, the Paris MOU provides
In the case of deficiencies which are clearly hazardous to
23 The relevant instruments are listed as follows:
International Convention on Load Lines, April 5, 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857,
(with 1988 Protocol).
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (with 1978
and 1988 Protocols), 14 I.L.M. 959.
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973 (MARPOL) with its 1978 Protocol, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 17 I.L.M. 546.
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 ("STCW").
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, 1972.
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, June 23,
1969.
Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO
Convention No. 147), 15 I.L.M. 1288.
24 Paris MOU para 3.4. "Clear grounds" includes notification by another authority or
complaint of the ship's master, crew or any person "with a legitimate interest in the safe
operation of the ship."
25 See the U.S. Coast Guard prioritization of vessels, infra.
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safety, health or the environment, the Authority will ...
ensure that the hazard is removed before the ship is allowed
to proceed to sea.26
Appropriate action may be taken which may include detention or stopping
the ship from continuing an operation by reason of established deficiencies
which, individually or together, would render the continued operation
hazardous. Exceptions are allowed where a ship needs to proceed to a repair
port. To prevent errant ship owners from running a detention, the MOU
stipulates that such ships will be refused access to any port within other party
states until the owner or operator has provided evidence of rectification of
the defects.27
One of the most important and effective provisions of the Paris MOU is
the obligation imposed upon each authority to publish quarterly information
about detentions under PSC procedures. This information is required not
only to contain the name of the ship, but also the name of her owner and
operator, her flag state, and her classification society. The reasons for the
detention are then given.
Initially, port states were reluctant to publish detention information,
particularly where owners were identified. They feared a rash of damages
suits by irate shipowners. Indeed, there have been a number of protests of
the content of detention publications. Publication, however, has in the past
three years become the norm: Publication allows the brokers of the world
to know what ships have been detained and why. Publication lets the
world's insurers know who the miscreants are. It lets the consumer,
passenger, or cargo shipper know who the delinquents are and lets them
avoid using substandard ships as an effective means of ridding the oceans of
their scourge. The port state authorities have become so comfortable with
the publication of detention lists that one may now find them regularly in
26 Paris MOU, para. 3.7.
27 Running a detention order, or failing to comply with it, remains a real possibility. The
Cypriot panamax bulk carrier San Marco (35538 grt, built in 1968) was detained by
Vancouver port authorities in 1993 after which BV withdrew her class. She was allowed to
proceed under tow, unmanned, for repairs in Mexico. But no repairs were undertaken. The
vessel slipped her tow, took her crew back on board, and proceeded to load a full cargo of
fertilizer. During this voyage, she hit heavy weather off Cape Town and lost shell plating
14x7m in the way of number 1 cargo hold. That the vessel reached the safety of Cape Town
and did not sink with all hands was nothing short of a miracle. The San Marco was as
substandard a ship as one could find, yet the Hellenic Register issued a full suite of
classification certificates after BV had withdrawn theirs.
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Lloyds List (U.K., Australia, Canada and the U.S., on a monthly basis) and
even on the internet.28 Indeed, the internet is likely to be a very valuable
coordinating tool in the administration of port state control procedures in the
future. It is the easiest way to access detention data bases and will certainly
become the prime means of publication of detained ships in the future.
Following the lead (and largely the letter) of the Paris MOU, The Tokyo
MOU for the Asian-Pacific region29 is up-and-running, although many of
the participating states have yet to establish effective port state control
facilities and procedures.
The Vina del Mar MOU, 1992, covers the Latin American maritime
authorities.3 ° This MOU recognizes the objectives of a further regional
maritime cooperation scheme3" and then again repeats, largely to the letter,
the provisions of the Paris MOU. Interesting additions to the Vina del Mar
MOU, however, are Annex IV and Appendix I, which seek to establish a
"Trade data interchange director" and a computer system to input the data
base records of the participating states.
The most recent port state control system is that set up in the Caribbean
on February 9, 1996, in terms practically identical to the Paris MOU.32
The United Kingdom is expected to sign the MOU on behalf of its
dependent territories in the Caribbean, and the MOU takes effect upon
28 See the following websites for monthly detention lists:
The United Kingdom at Marine Safety Agency,
<http://www.detr.gov.uk/msa/det97/det97.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998),
Australia at AMSA PSC Statistics,
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/sp/shipdet/sdetlink.htm>(visitedFeb. 5, 1998),
The United States at United States Coastguard,
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/psc/detained.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).29 See<http://www.imo.org/imo/news/296/psc.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998). This binds the
maritime authorities of Australia, Canada, People's Republic of China, Fiji, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Russian Federation, Republic of Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Republic of Vanuatu,
and Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
"Binding Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay
and Venezuela. See IMO news 2/96 available at
<http://www.imo.org/imo/news/296/summary.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
31 Rocram, 1989. See IMO news 2/96 available at
<http://www.imo.org/imo/news/296/summary.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
32 The Caribbean MOU binds Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, Netherlands and Belize, Surinam and Trinidad & Tobago. See IMO news
2/96 available at <http://www.imo.org/imo/news/296/summary.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
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signature of each participating country.
Other regional initiatives are on the way. The Iranian Maritime Adminis-
tration is piloting discussions among West and Central African and Persian
Gulf States for an Indian Ocean rim initiative. Clearly, the success of these
regional MOU's is dependent upon the efforts of each other.
IV. DOMESTIC ENABLING MEASURES
Armed with this formidable array of international instruments and
bolstered by the resolutions of both the ILO and IMO, it is up to port states
to exercise port state control in a manner consistent with their own domestic
legislation. Many scholars suggest that port state control is not an option.
Rather it is an obligation in international law for parties to SOLAS,
UNCLOS, and regional initiatives. Port state control even becomes an
obligation by virtue of their membership in the IMO alone.
Many states have promulgated domestic legislation to give effect to the
notions of port state control. We shall examine briefly the jurisdictions of
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, and New
Zealand.
A. The United States
The United States has, since May 1, 1994, promoted a rigorous and public
policy of foreign vessel inspection.33 Port state control in the United States
is conducted by the United States Coast Guard ("USCG"). Prior to 1994,
the USCG concerned itself mainly with limited aspects of navigation safety
and pollution prevention, particularly in relation to tanker and passenger
vessels. It was unusual for the Coast Guard to intervene to enforce the
compendium of international instruments embraced by port state control.
In three years, the USCG has established a probing port state control
system over the approximately 8000 foreign flag ships that use U.S. ports
each year. The aim of the program is clearly to eradicate the presence of
" The public face of U.S. port state control may be viewed at the United States Coast
Guard website, <http://www.usc.mil/hq/g-m/psc/psc.htm>(visited Feb. 5, 1998). Much of the
material used in this prrcis has been taken from that site.
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substandard ships in U.S. waters.34 To this extent, its aim parallels that of
the American OPA.35
Legislative authority is given to the United States Coast Guard under the
United States Code.36 Chapter 33 gives reciprocity to other parties to the
SOLAS convention, which is a welcome step in the direction of an
international initiative. The USCG requires all vessels of 1600 GRT or more
to give advanced notice of their arrival. 37  The USCG then checks the
vessel's details against its own records and that of its register and assigns
points to each ship for compliance with international conventions, previous
track records and those of sister ships in the same ownership or management,
ratings of the flag and classification society involved. This is a clear
departure from the initial 'no discrimination' provisions of early port state
control measures. Indeed, the purpose of USCG port state control is to
recognize high risk vessels, their owners, and their classification societies
and to take appropriate action.
Upon the points rating, the ship is then categorized as Priority I, II or III.
Priority I high risk vessels require inspection before they are even allowed
into port limits, often at the buoys. Defects must be rectified before the
vessel enters port if at all possible.
USCG Regulations set out detailed guidelines for port state control
examinations. The proviso is given that:
34 Paragraph C13 of the USCG's Instruction Procedures defines the 'Sub-standard Ship'
as follows:
"In general a vessel is regarded as sub-standard if the hull, machinery, or
equipment, such a life-saving, fire fighting and pollution prevention, are
substantially below the standards required by U.S. laws or international
conventions owing to: (a) the absence of required principle equipment or
arrangement; (b) gross non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with
required specification; (c) substantial deterioration of the vessel structure
or its essential equipment; (d) non-compliance with applicable operation
and/or manning standards; or (e) clear lack of appropriate certification or
demonstrated lack of competence on the part of the crew. If these evident
factors as a whole, or individually endanger the vessel, persons on board,
or present an unreasonable risk to the marine environment, the vessel
should be regarded as a sub-standard ship <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-
m/nmc/pubs/msm/v2/cl9.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
31 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (1997).
36 46 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3318 (1975 and Supp. 1997).
37 Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-1232 (1986). There is a
proposal under discussion at present to reduce the tonnage to 300 GRT.
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PSC examinations are not intended nor desired to be
analogous to an inspection for certification of a U.S. flag
vessel. Rather they are intended to be of sufficient breadth
and depth to satisfy a boarding team that a vessel's major
systems are in compliance with applicable international
standards and domestic requirements, and that the crew,
possess sufficient proficiency to safely operate the vessel.
The examinations are designed to determine that required
certificates are aboard and valid, and that a vessel conforms
to the conditions required for the issuance of required
certificates. This is accomplished by a walk-through
examination and visual assessment of a vessels relevant
components, certificates and documents, and may be
accompanied by limited testing of systems and the crew.
When the examination reveals questionable equipment,
systems or crew incompetence, the boarding team may
expand the examination to conduct such operational tests or
examinations as deemed appropriate.38
The most significant aspect of the U.S. Coast Guard's port state control
policy is the publication of lists of owners & operators, flag states, and
classification societies which have run afoul of USCG port state control
procedures during the past twelve months. The USCG diligently publishes
monthly detention records, giving full details of the vessel and the defects
both on its website and in Lloyds List.39
Flags, owners and operators, and classification societies are assessed to
help assign the priority rating to a vessel under inspection upon the declared
policy that "if any of these entities fails to fully undertake its responsibilities
for a ships safe operation, then the ship is likely to be considered a sub-
standard vessel by the USCG.' 4 A percentage rating is then given to both
flags and classification societies.41 The list and the detention ratio is
8 See <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/msm/r2/c19.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
39 The Lloyds List publications unfortunately do not give owners' particulars. LloydsList
April 29, 1997 page 13. It would appear that Lloyd's List is reluctant to put owners' and
classification societies' names to print.
40 See the lists' publication at the USCG website, supra note 28.
,' The May 1997 targeted flag state list is headed by Honduras, followed by Belize,
Morocco, Ukraine and Romania. Facts taken from the U.S. Coastguard's Port State Control
website, <http://www.uscg.mil/hg/g-m/psc/psc.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
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constantly updated.42 Additionally, the flags and classification societies
themselves are categorized for priority status.43
B. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) has suffered the exposure of two major
maritime casualties having a bearing on the issue of sub-standard ships in
recent times. The first was the tragic capsizing of the ferry Herald of Free
Enterprise and the second the grounding of the tanker Braer off the Shetland
Islands in 1993. Both gave rise to extensive and critical self-examination of
the U.K.'s maritime safety measures, and the Braer disaster led to the most
comprehensive inquiry into maritime pollution and safety yet undertaken in
the form of the "Safer Ships, Cleaner Seas Report.,
44
The port state control function is deputized to the Marine Safety Agency
(MSA).45  The MSA undertakes survey, inspection, and certification to
ensure compliance with domestic and international marine standards by both
U.K. registered and foreign vessels. The MSA has also recently taken on a
public face with an internet site giving details of its operation and publishing
monthly detention lists. 46 In addition to publishing its website, the MSA
publishes monthly detention lists in Lloyds List. As in the U.S., owners and
classification society details are not published in Lloyds List. Such details
do, however, appear on the website.
The U.K. is a party to the Paris MOU, and its detention procedures are
thus regulated by the MOU and its guidelines. U.K. law recognizes its own
inherent jurisdiction to exercise full domestic control over foreign flag
42 Honduras' detention ratio was 56% of all flag vessels inspected. Facts taken from the
U.S. Coastguard's Port State Control website at id.
" The May 1997 figures based upon 1996 inspections give the Romanian Registrar of
Shipping first place (39%), followed closely by the Hellenic Register (27%). Facts taken
from the U.S. Coastguard's Port State Control website at id.
" The Report of the Enquiry into the Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping
presented by Lord Donaldson and published by HMSO as CM2560. This report should be
essential reading for any person interested in maritime safety. For a follow-up to the report,
see Lord Donaldson, WakefordMemorialLecturedelivered at Southampton on Feb. 26, 1996,
<http://www.tcp.co.uk/-glang/wakeford.html> (visited Sept. 29, 1997)
45 Established on I st April 1994 in anticipation of the publication of the Donaldson report.
See Marine Safety Agency, <http://www.detr.gov.uk/msa/msahome.htm> (visited Feb. 5,
1998).
46 id.
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vessels by voluntarily using its ports.47 The U.K. has reportedly set a 30%
inspection target for itself (see the 25 percent target set by the Paris MOU)
and the MSA has succeeded in achieving a target in excess of that figure.
In accordance with an agreement between the Paris MOU states, discrimina-
tion is now allowed to pay particular attention to vessels considered to
present special risks.48
It is clear from the review of its 1996 detentions that the U.K. is 'doing
its bit' to make port state control public and to make it work.49 There were
184 foreign flag detentions during 1996 which reflected an overall detention
rate of 8.4 percent of all inspections carried out for 1996. This compares to
the detention rate of 11.6 percent for 1995.
It is also significant to note that five flag states accounted for over half of
the ships detained. It is clear that certain registers are substandard.5"
Perhaps Panama's situation should be viewed in the light of its regis-
ter--containing the bulk of the world's merchant fleet-and with recognition
of its efforts to improve the safety record of its vessels.
C. Australia5
One should look to Australia for an indication of the most conspicuously
effective port state control program. Australia needed a catastrophic catalyst
for its maritime authorities to take notice of the malaise which was
permeating the shipping industry by the end of the 1980s. Following the
relatively unexplained loss of six bulk carriers off the Australian coast
between January 1990 and August 1991, an inquiry was convened "to
enquire into and report on the issue of ships' safety at the national and
international level" with particular concentration on bulk carrier vessels and
foreign flag vessels plying Australian ports. The report of chairman Peter
17 See the Donaldson Commission 5.79.
"' These are passenger and ro-ro ships, specialized carriers such as chemical or gas
carriers, ships known from Paris MOU data bases to have had recent reported deficiencies,
ships of specified flag states that have a poor safety record as assessed by their detention ratio
within other Paris MOU members, and bulk carriers.
"' Marine Safety Agency-Detention Lists 1996,
<http://www.detr.gov.uk/msa/det96/det96.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
'0 The delinquent registers (with detentions) are Cyprus (32); Russia (19); Malta (18);
Panama (13); and Turkey (12), id.
51 I am grateful to Capt. Peter Murphy for information given to me confirming the
legislative provisions of Australian port state control.
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Morris titled "Ships of Shame" did more perhaps to highlight the plight of
the industry than any other initiative before or since. It records a roll of
neglect, inefficiency, corruption and tragedy. Although the roll was
substantially under check-largely through the effectiveness of international
port state control measures-the roll, sadly, has yet to have its last entry
posted. Bulk carriers continue to sink in unexplained circumstances with
appalling loss of life. But the port state control initiative which flowed from
the Morris Report in Australia has sent a strong message to substandard
operators to keep their ships away from Australian waters.
The Australian Safety Maritime Authority (AMSA) conducts port state
control in Australia; it also has adopted a public face and complies with its
publications to make its detentions known by publishing monthly statistics
in the local and international shipping media and on its website.52 As a
member of the Asia-Pacific MOU, Australia does more than comply with its
25% inspection target. In 1996, Australia, inspected 2901 vessels, of which
248 were detained. Like the U.K., Australia has no qualms about publishing
delinquent flags and substandard classification societies, and these may be
found on the AMSA website on a monthly basis.53 The site also gives
details of detentions indexed by ship type, an interesting addition.
The domestic legislative basis of the AMSA's inspections may be found
in the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912 of (as amended) sec 210. 4
According to the terms of that section, if it appears to the AMSA that a ship
is unseaworthy or substandard, the AMSA may order the ship to be
provisionally detained, and shall immediately give the master of the ship
notice of the provisional detention with a statement of the grounds for the
detention. The AMSA must then commission a report as to whether the ship
is unseaworthy or substandard-a distinction which I have previously argued
should be one of semantics only." The Master of the ship must be given
a copy of the report upon the strength of which a decision is taken whether
to order the ship to be finally detained or to release her unconditionally (or
on such conditions that the AMSA considers appropriate). If an order for
the final detention of the ship is made, the ship shall not be released until the
52 AMSA PSC Statistics: 1996 Summary,
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/sp/shipdet/sdetlink.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
5 AMSA Home Page, <http://www.amsa.gov.au> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
Commonwealth Navigation Act, 1912, sec. 210 (Austl.) (detention of unseaworthy and
substandard ships).
" See Hare, supra note 1.
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AMSA is satisfied that her further detention is no longer necessary and
orders her released.
D. South Africa
South Africa, like Australia, has too long been a favored destination for
unscrupulous ship-owners. It suffers the additional risk of being on the most
economical geographical route between the West and the East, and has a foul
coastline with seasonal rough seas to boot. It is scarcely surprising therefore
that South Africa has suffered more than its fair share of casualties, many
involving sub-standard ships. The South African coastline has hosted three
of the world's ten largest VOC losses. One of these was the second largest
oil tanker ever lost. 6 South Africa has sufficient domestic legislative
muscle to give full effect to port state control procedures. South Africa,
which became a full member of the IMO in 1996, has recently brought its
accession to international instruments up to date. The new South African
government, shortly after attaining power in April 1994, commissioned a full
inquiry into maritime transport policy, including matters of maritime safety
which resulted in the publication of a white paper in September 1996
recognizing the importance of bolstering the South African port state control
procedures. 7
In addition to its international obligations and their concomitant powers,
South Africa's main authority for inspection may be found in the Marine
Traffic Act (1981) and the regulations published in the terms of that Act. 8
At this stage, South Africa is not a party to any regional initiative, but is
looking both west and east to align itself with initiatives in Latin America
56 In 1983 the Spanish tanker Castillo de Bellver, carrying 276,000 tons of light Arabian
crude oil, suffered a crack amidships, caught fire, broke in half, and sank 12 miles off the
western seaboard of South Africa. The bulk of the oil was contained in the aft section, which
was towed out 300 miles and sank in 3,000 meters with no significant coastal pollution.
17 For the policy report of the Committee, chaired by the author, see UCT Marine &
Shipping Law, <http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/portstat.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998). For
the White Paper on National Transport Policy, see
<http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/witpaper.htm> (visited Feb. 5, 1998).
's § 9 of the Marine Traffic Act (1981). Marine Traffic Act,
<http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/martram.htm>(visitedFeb. 5, 1998). The Actallowsthe
South Africa Department of Transport to require a shipmaster to give details of his ship and
cargo, produce all papers and documents relative to the ship and allow authorized persons on
board the ship to inspect the ship, its equipment and cargo.
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and in the Indian Ocean Rim. The officials in the Department of Transport
are actively engaged in an ongoing review of their port state control
capability, and international cooperation. There is little doubt that regional
initiatives covering the oceans to the west and east of South Africa will be
formed. It would also make sense for South Africa to join the Asia-Pacific
MOU as much of its passing traffic is destined for the Far East or Australia.
South Africa should apply for the status of "co-operating authority" from all
the other MOU's-not just those covering ports from which South African
trade originates. South Africa's geographical location makes her particularly
susceptible to passing tramp shipping from any part of the world.
South Africa has, however, a long road to travel to reach internationally
accepted levels of inspection. Owing to under-manning, the current overall
inspection rate is below 5%, although a higher percentage is achieved for
bulk carriers and other high risk vessels. Hopefully, the initiative to form
a South African Maritime Safety Authority,59 to which most of the
maritime powers of the Ministry of Transport are to be delegated, will vastly
improve South Africa's port state control focus and capability. It is an
initiative which deserves the highest priority in the wake of the continued
presence of substandard vessels in South African ports.6" It is envisaged
that SAMSA could be in operation by the beginning of October 1997.
'9 Draft South African Maritime Safety Authority Act,
<http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/samsa.htm>(visited Feb. 5, 1998) (proposed legislation
to give effect to SAMSA).
60 On 18, April 1997, the MV Neamt, 5931 grt, was detained by the South Africa
Department of Transport under port state control measures. She had taken 48 days to sail
from West Africa with a cargo of cashew nuts. Lloyds List Africa Weekly, May 9, reports:
"With no radar, no navigation lights and a useless compass, the crew found their way to Cape
Town by asking passing vessels on their VHF radios where they were. On the way, the
vessel's engines caught fire seven times, as the pistons have no rings and blowbacks caused
small fires throughout the voyage. Of her three generators, only one worked sporadically.
The Chief Engineer reported that all the carbon dioxide fire-fighting cylinders were empty and
the engine's cooling systems were completely broken down, as water supply pipes had rusted
through from the inside. Inside the vessel is constantly dark because all the light bulbs have
blown, and there are no spares. The vessel's crew have not been paid for four months, and
there is no food on board. The refrigerators are not working ... "
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E. New Zealand'
South Africa has taken much encouragement for the proposed establish-
ment of its semi-privatized, fee-levying safety authority from the successful
metamorphosis of New Zealand's state maritime transport authority. In 1994
New Zealand vested most state maritime authority in its newly-established
Maritime Safety Authority.6
2
New Zealand's Maritime Transport Act (1994), empowers the Authority
to detain any ship and impose conditions for its release where the "operation
or use of (the ship) endangers or is likely to endanger any person or
property, or is hazardous to the health of safety of any person"; or where
"the appropriate prescribed maritime document is not for the time being in
force in respect of the ship, or the master of any member of the crew of that
ship."
There is a more general ground for the exercise of powers where "the
Director is satisfied, on clear grounds, that the master is not, or crew are not,
familiar with essential shipboard procedures for the safe operation of the
ship."63
New Zealand, like Australia, has taken steps to absolve port state control
officials from liability for actions taken in good faith.' As has been seen
above, New Zealand is a party to the Asia-Pacific MOU, 1993.
V. APPEAL PROCEDURES, COSTS AND WRONGFUL DETENTION
The achilles heel of current international port state control practice is that
authorities may be concerned by their possible exposure to actions for
wrongful detention where a ship is detained for what subsequently turns out
to be insufficient cause. If a chartered vessel is facing cancellation dates and
is unable to complete loading or discharge by reason of a port state control
detention, her owners would clearly suffer considerable financial losses.
These losses may be mirrored down the charter party chain, and could be
compounded by publicized allegations that the owner's hitherto good trading
name has been tarnished.
611 am grateful to Mr. Tony Martin of the New Zealand Maritime Safety Authority for
his useful input.
62 Maritime Transport Act § 55, 1994.
63 See id. § 55(d).
See infra note 69.
[Vol. 26:571
PORT STATE CONTROL
In most jurisdictions, the actions of port state authorities, which are
required by the MOU's to have either direct or delegated state powers,
65
would be treated as the actions of the state and would be subject to ordinary
administrative review procedures. The regional MOU's provide appeal
procedures.6 6 Additionally, some countries provide specific appeal proce-
dures in their domestic enabling legislation.67
But what of the actions of the officials concerned, and of the liability of
the authorities as their employers? Port state inspectors are required by the
MOU's and by the IMO to be vested with delegated state powers. Being
state employees, inspectors and their authority employers could find their
actions under the same scrutiny as applied to an arrest of persons without
good cause.68
Both the Australian and the New Zealand domestic legislation have taken
a proactive stance in relation to liability of their port state control officers.
The Australian Commonwealth Navigation Act, 1912, contains recent
amendments which absolve officials from liability for "anything done under
the provisions of (the Navigation Act) unless direct proof of corruption or
malice be given., 69
The New Zealand statute absolves members and employees of the
authority from personal liability for acts done "in good faith in pursuance or
intended pursuance of the functions or powers of the authority or of the
Director."70
To give full effect to port state control, all states should follow the
Australian and New Zealand leads and enact an indemnification of officials
for actions taken in good faith. The Australian requirement that "corruption
65 The authority must authorize "properly qualified persons" for inspections, but may be
assisted by "any person with the required expertise" provided they have no commercial
interest in the ship or in the port. See para. 3.5 of the Paris MOU. Memorandum of
Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreement on Maritime Environment,
January 26, 1982, para. 3.2, 21 I.L.M. 1.
66See, e.g., Paris Memorandum of Understanding supra note 65, para. 3.13, 21 I.L.M. 1.
67 See, e.g., Maritime Transport Act, 1994 (N.Z.) § 55(7), (allowing port state control
decisions to be taken on appeal to a District Court).
61 See, e.g., § 5(4) of Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act of 1983, 1995 JSRSA I
(S.A.) "Any person who ... without reasonable and probable cause obtains the arrest of
property ... shall be liable to any person suffering loss or damage as a result thereof for that
loss or damage."
69 Navigation Act, 1912, § 384(1).
70 Maritime Transport Act, § 34.
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or malice" must be proved in order to found the claim makes sense.
Allowing damages to be claimed against the port state control authority
because good cause is not subsequently shown with the wisdom of hindsight
would unduly inhibit port state control. If a few ships are detained for
insufficient reason and commercial losses are suffered thereby, it would be
a small price to pay to ensure the efficacy of port state control and its
resultant protection of life and property.
The costs of port state control inspections are borne by the port state
authority, although it has become relatively common practice for states to
levy a maritime safety charge upon vessels calling at their ports. Thus, for
example, the various maritime safety authorities are able to fund their
operations to an extent on a "user pays" principle. Once a vessel is detained
for non-compliance, however, provision is usually made for all costs to be
borne by the ship-owner.7
VI. THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS
How does one measure the success of an international initiative such as
port state control? Ideally, the first prize would be a significant drop in the
number of seamens' lives lost due to the foundering of their ships. Sadly,
we are not yet seeing such tangible results. The losses continue, apparently
unabated. In particular, obos and other bulk carriers, having endured a long
and hard-working life loading and carrying unforgiving cargoes such as iron
ore, are then extended into overtime by marginal operators who can only
afford minimum maintenance and below-basic crew wages.
The Institute of London Underwriters' monthly casualty returns72 record
almost monthly that another bulker has been lost at sea with all hands.73
On the positive side, a trend is emerging which shows at least a levelling of
losses. The Institute's confirmed total losses for each year were 1993 (140
71 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 65, which upon revelation of
deficiencies allows all inspection costs (by implication the revealing inspection and all
subsequent measures) to be recovered from the deficient vessel's owners. The ship need not
be released from detention until such costs are paid. A similar provision is found in Section
56 of the New Zealand Maritime Transport Act of 1994.
72 Published monthly by Lloyd's List-see the 1996 cumulative returns in Lloyd's List
April 19 at p. 9
" See Lloyd's List April 19 at p 8: "The Leros Strength sank in heavy seas about 30
miles west of Stavanger on February 8. Master had reported leakage to the bow causing
navigational problems. 20 crew missing. Oil spillage occurred."
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ships); 1995 (112 ships); 1996 (111 ships). 1997 saw 20 ships lost in
January and February alone.
But there is little doubt that those jurisdictions taking their Port State
Control obligations seriously (and who are fortunate enough to have the
means to do so) are narrowing the trading options of the substandard ship.
The new STCW provisions,74 the ISM standards" and novel and necessary
measures such as ship identification devices similar to those employed on
aircraft (which coastal and port states are now authorized by IMO resolution
to make mandatory), all indicate that the maritime industry is taking the
problem seriously.
Of Australia, once a favored destination for sub-standard ships, and of the
U.S. (both of whose programs are relatively new) a Lloyds List editor
recently wrote:
You would have to be mad or terminally ignorant to fix a
marginal ship out of an Australian port, and if you have an
oil cargo to ship to the U.S. you would need quality tonnage
operated by demonstrably high quality managers.76
The New Zealand Maritime Safety Authority seems to be getting a similar
message across. And the ITF earlier this year embarked on a program of
targeting certain European ports to ensure that calling vessels demonstrated
required safety standards. The ITF's campaign against flags of convenience,
waged for over 40 years, has surely reinforced the message. The ITF's
battle is not just against unfair wage and labor conditions, it also aims to
root out flags of convenience and the substandard ships they so often
allow.77
CONCLUSION
International port state control has come of age. With its roots founded
in necessity bred of successive maritime casualties, port state control has
Imposing improved standards of training and watchkeeping; in effect from I February
1997.
7S See supra, section II.
76 Lloyds List March 27 1977.
77 See the ITF website, <http://www.itf.org.uk> (visited Feb. 5, 1998) for details of its
campaign.
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come into its own as the most effective means of ridding the world's ports
and oceans of sub-standard, unseaworthy and dangerous ships. This is not
to say that international pressure on flag states, owners and classification
societies to do their jobs properly and responsibly should be in any way
relaxed. The reality, however, remains that there are good and bad ship-
owners. There are good and bad classification societies. And there are good
and bad ship registers. Let the international message of port state control be
loud and clear: bad ships, bad owners, bad flag states and bad classification
societies are pariahs for which there should be no place in the shipping
industry of the future.
